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Abstract
In this article we relate a family of methods for automated inductive
theorem proving based on cycle detection in saturation-based provers
to well-known theories of induction. To this end we introduce the no-
tion of clause set cycles – a formalism abstracting a certain type of
cyclic dependency between clause sets. We first show that the for-
malism of clause set cycles is contained in the theory of ∃1 induction.
Secondly, we consider the relation between clause set cycles and the
theory of open induction. By providing a finite axiomatization of a
theory of triangular numbers with open induction we show that the
formalism of clause set cycles is not contained in the theory of open
induction. Furthermore, we conjecture that open induction and clause
set cycles are incomparable. Finally, we transfer these results to a
concrete method of automated inductive theorem proving called the
n-clause calculus.
1 Introduction
The subject of automated inductive theorem proving (AITP) aims at au-
tomating the process of finding proofs by mathematical induction. AITP is
of paramount importance to the formal verification of software and hardware.
Every non-trivial program contains loops or recursion, hence its verification
requires some inductive reasoning. But also the development of proof assis-
tants can benefit from automated inductive theorem proving by providing
hammers that can discharge lemmas automatically.
It is folklore that finding suitable induction axioms is difficult because of
the non-analyticity of induction formulas. The non-analyticity of induction
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formulas can be explained proof-theoretically by the failure of cut-elimination
in LK with an induction rule, see [7] for a precise statement. A wide variety
of approaches have been proposed to address this problem. Among others
there are approaches based on enhancements of saturation-based provers
[5, 6, 8], cyclic proofs [1], rippling [3], theory exploration [4], etc. Most
of these approaches are rather technical in nature and are thus difficult to
analyze formally. Hence, most of the analyses carried out for methods of
automated inductive theorem proving are empirical and little is known about
the theoretical properties of these methods. We believe that providing formal
analyses of these methods will contribute to the theoretical foundations of
the subject and thus help in developing better methods.
The work presented in this article continues the analysis of Kersani and
Peltier’s n-clause calculus started in [10]. In [10] refutations of the n-clause
calculus are translated into proofs of the sequent calculus LKID introduced in
[2]. This translation makes it possible to read off the induction formulas used
by the n-clause calculus. The analysis carried out in [10] operates directly
on the n-clause calculus as originally defined in [8] without introducing an
intermediary abstraction. Therefore, the results obtained in [10] are compli-
cated by inessential technical details. Furthermore, the technicalities of the
n-clause calculus made it difficult to state conjectures clearly. For instance,
the n-clause calculus imposes restrictions on the types of function symbols.
Because of these restrictions it is already difficult to express simple proper-
ties such as for example the associativity of natural numbers. In this article
we extend the previous work by introducing an abstraction called clause set
cycles. This new formalism abstracts the inessential details of the n-clause
calculus, thus, allowing us to carry out a more systematic analysis and to
formulate more general conjectures.
The article is structured as follows. In Section 2 we will define the notion
of clause set cycle and the associated notion of refutability by a clause set
cycle. We will then situate these notions with respect to ∃1 induction, and
hence show that the formalism is inherently weak. This result is a gener-
alization of the main theorem (Theorem 6.27) of [10]. In Section 3 we will
provide a finite axiomatization for a theory of triangular numbers with open
induction. This result will then serve as the main technical result in Section
4, where we will show that the notion of refutability by a clause set cycle is
not weaker than open induction. In Section 5 we will show that the n-clause
calculus is indeed a special case of the system of clause set cycles and transfer
the main results of sections 2 and 4 to the n-clause calculus. We thus answer
positively the conjecture of [10] that there exists a clause set that is refutable
by the n-clause calculus, but that is not refutable with open induction. As
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a result we situate the power of the n-clause calculus with respect to the
theories of ∃1 induction and open induction.
2 Clause Set Cycles and ∃1 Induction
We work in a many-sorted first-order classical logic. By a many-sorted first-
order classical logic we understand a classical first-order logic that allows
finitely many sorts s1, . . . , sn, representing pairwise disjoint universes. Each
function symbol f has a type of the form f : sf1 × · · · × s
f
n → s
f
n+1, where
sf1 , . . . , s
f
n, s
f
n+1 are sorts. Analogously, a predicate symbol P has a type of
the form sP1 × · · · × s
P
n , where s
P
1 , . . . , s
P
n are sorts. Each individual variable
ranges over a fixed sort. Whenever the sort of a variable is clear from the
context, we will not mention it explicitly. Terms and formulas are defined
as usual, but function symbols and relation symbols need to be applied to
terms that agree with the type of the symbol.
Every language that we consider is supposed to contain at least the sort
nat representing the natural numbers, with its function symbols 0 : nat
representing the number 0 and s : nat → nat representing the successor
function. In case the language contains only one sort, we specify function
symbols by pairs of the form f/n where f is a function symbol and n is
a natural number representing the arity of the symbol f . In the following
we fix one such language and denote it by L. Formulas, structures, models,
truth, validity, |=, ⊢, etc. are defined as usual.
By η we denote a distinguished variable ranging over the sort nat. We will
call this variable η a parameter. The parameter η is mainly used to indicate
positions on which arguments by induction take place, that is, the parameter
usually plays the role of the induction variable. Usually the parameter η
will occur freely, in other words, it will not be bound by quantifiers and
therefore behaves similarly to a constant. In the literature a similar concept
of parameter is used, with the difference that the parameter is usually a
constant (even a Skolem constant). In our case treating the parameter as a
variable seems to be more natural, especially when dealing with the language
of induction formulas.
Let f be a unary function symbol and t a term. In order to save paren-
theses we write ft for the term f(t). By fnt we abbreviate the term
f(f(. . . f︸ ︷︷ ︸
n times
(t) . . . )).
Let n ∈ N, then by n we denote the term sn0. Let t, t1, . . . , tn be terms
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of sort nat and + be a function symbol of type nat × nat → nat denoting
the addition of natural numbers. For the sake of readability we will use the
symbol + as an infix symbol. The expression t1 + t2 + · · · + tn abbreviates
the term (. . . (t1 + t2) + . . . ) + tn and nt denotes the term
t+ t+ · · · + t︸ ︷︷ ︸
n times
.
Definition 1 (Literal, Clause, Clause set). An L formula l(~x) is called an L
literal if it is an atom or the negation of an atom. An L formula C(~x) is said
to be an L clause if it of the form ∀~y
∨k
i=1 li where li(~x, ~y) with i ∈ {1, . . . , k}
is a literal. An L formula S(~x) is called an L clause set if it is of the form∧m
i=1 Ci where Ci with i ∈ {1, . . . ,m} is a clause.
When the language L is clear from the context we simply say literal,
clause, and clause set instead of L literal, L clause, and L clause set.
Let ϕ and ψ be formulas, then by ϕ → ψ we abbreviate the formula
¬ϕ ∨ ψ. In particular if a1, . . . , an, and b1, . . . , bm are atoms, then
(a1 ∧ · · · ∧ an)→ (b1 ∨ · · · ∨ bm)
abbreviates the clause
∨n
i=1 ¬ai∨
∨m
i=1 bi. In order to save some parentheses
we assume that → associates to the right and has a lower precedence than
¬,∨,∧. We usually present a concrete clause set
∧n
i=1 Ci as the list of clauses
C1, . . . , Cn. Similarly, we will usually present the axioms of a theory as a list
of formulas. We are now ready to define the notion of clause set cycles and
the related notion of refutability by a clause set cycle.
Definition 2. An L clause set S(η) is called an L clause set cycle if it
satisfies the following conditions
S(sη) |= S(η), (1)
S(0) |= ⊥. (2)
Note that clause set cycles do not operate in some background theory.
However, a clause set cycle may contain clauses without free variables and
these clauses act as a background theory. A clause set cycle has a natural
interpretation as an argument by infinite descent, which we will later explain
in terms of induction. Before that, we introduce the notion of refutation by
a clause set cycle. A refutation by a clause set cycle consists of a clause set
cycle and a case distinction.
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Definition 3. We say that an L clause set R(η) is refuted by an L clause
set cycle S(η) if there exists a natural number n such that
R(snη) |= S(η), (3)
R(k) |= ⊥, for all k ∈ {0, . . . , n− 1}. (4)
If the language is clear we simply speak of clause sets cycles and of clause
sets refuted by a clause set cycle. Let us consider an example in order to
clarify the notions of clause set cycle and refutation by a clause set cycle.
Example 4. Let P and Q be unary predicate symbols over the sort nat and
let R(η) be the clause set consisting of the clauses
Q(η),
¬Q(0),
∀x (Q(sx)→ P(x)),
¬P(0),
∀x (P(sx)→ P(x)).
Let S(η) := P(η) ∧ ¬P(0) ∧ ∀x (P(sx) → P(x)). We clearly have S(0) |= ⊥
and, moreover, S(sη) |= S(η). Hence S(η) is a clause set cycle. Moreover
we have R(sη) |= P(η). Thus, R(sη) |= S(η) and, furthermore, R(0) |= ⊥.
Hence R(η) is refuted by the clause set cycle S(η).
The notions of clause set cycle and of refutability by a clause set cycle
may appear restrictive at the first sight in the sense that the clause set
cycles do neither allow for an arbitrary step width nor for an offset. The
following proposition shows that relaxing these conditions does not increase
the strength of the system.
Proposition 5. Let R(η), S(η) be L clause sets, n, i ≥ 0 and j > 0 such
that
R(k) |= ⊥, for k = 0, . . . , n− 1,
R(snη) |= S(siη),
S(k + i) |= ⊥, for k = 0, . . . , j − 1,
S(si+jη) |= S(siη).
Then R(η) is refuted by an L clause set cycle.
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Proof. It is straightforward to see that the offset i is inessential, by letting
T (η) := S(siη). Now in order to show that an arbitrary step j is inessential
we let
U(η) :=
j−1∨
l=0
T (slη).
We will show that U is a clause set cycle. To show that U satisfies (1),
it suffices to observe that by the assumption, we have T (k) |= ⊥ for k =
0, . . . , j − 1. Therefore U(0) |= ⊥. In order to show that U satisfies (2),
we need to consider two cases. First let l ∈ {0, . . . , j − 2}, then we have
T (sl+1η) |= T (sl+1η), which implies T (slsη) |= U(η). Now let l = j − 1,
then we have T (sjη) |= T (η) by the assumption and, thus, T (slsη) |= U(η).
Therefore, U is a clause set cycle and R is refuted by U .
Clause set cycles thus abstract parameters such as offset and step width
and therefore simplify a formal analysis.
Let ψ(x, ~z) be a formula where x is a variable of sort nat, then the
structural induction axiom Ixψ is defined by
Ixψ := ∀~z (ψ(0, ~z)→ ∀x (ψ(x, ~z)→ ψ(sx, ~z))→ ∀xψ(x, ~z)).
By an ∃1 formula we understand a formula of the form ∃~xϕ(~x, ~y), where ϕ
is quantifier-free. The notion of ∀1 formulas is defined dually to ∃1 formulas.
We will now introduce the two theories of induction that are of interest for
the study of the formalism of clause set cycles.
Definition 6. The theories I∃1(L) and IOpen(L) are given by
I∃1(L) := {Ixψ | ψ(x, ~z) is an ∃1, L formula with x : nat},
IOpen(L) := {Ixψ | ψ(x, ~z) is a quantifier-free, L formula with x : nat}.
Whenever the language L is clear from the context or irrelevant, we will
write I∃1, IOpen instead of I∃1(L), IOpen(L). Let ϕ(x) be a formula with
x of sort nat, then we say that ϕ is inductive if ⊢ ϕ(0) and ϕ(x) ⊢ ϕ(sx).
Let us now consider how the notions of clause set cycles and refutability
by a clause set cycle relate to provability in theories of induction. Let S(x)
be a clause set cycle, then by (1), (2), and by the completeness of first-order
logic, we obtain ⊢ ¬S(0) and ¬S(x) ⊢ ¬S(sx). In other words, the formula
¬S(x) is inductive. Since S is a clause set, S is logically equivalent to a ∀1
formula, hence ¬S(x) is logically equivalent to an ∃1 formula. Therefore, we
have:
6
Proposition 7. Let S(x) be a clause set cycle, then we have I∃1 ⊢ ¬S(x).
Intuitively a refutation by a clause set cycle consists of a clause set cy-
cle and a case distinction. The case distinction with n ∈ N cases can be
formalized as follows:
Cn(x) :=
(
n−1∨
i=0
x = i
)
∨ ∃y x = sn(y).
Since Cn is clearly inductive and logically equivalent to an ∃1 formula, the
formula Cn is provable with ∃1 induction. So we have:
Lemma 8. Let n ∈ N, then I∃1 ⊢ Cn.
Let now R(x) be a clause set refuted by a clause set cycle S(x). Then
there exists a natural number n ∈ N such that R and S satisfy the conditions
(3) and (4). We thus have
⊢ ¬R(i), i = 0, 1, . . . , n− 1, (5)
¬S(x) ⊢ ¬R(sn(x)). (6)
By the Lemma above we can proceed in I∃1 by case distinction on the
variable x. If x = i, then we obtain ¬R(x) by (5). Otherwise if x = sn(x′)
for some x′, then by Proposition 7 and (6) we have ¬R(sn(x′)), thus ¬R(x).
We therefore obtain:
Theorem 9. If a clause set R(x) is refuted by a clause set cycle, then
I∃1 ⊢ ¬R(x).
Refutability by a clause set cycle is thus contained in the theory of ∃1
induction. Therefore, methods for AITP that are based on clause set cycles
can not prove statements that require induction on formulas with two or more
quantifier alternations. This limitation is due to clause set cycles operating
on clause sets instead of some larger set of formulas. Similar limitations
may apply to other AITP methods that extend saturation-based provers by
induction mechanisms that involve only clauses.
3 Open Induction and Triangular numbers
In this section we will provide a finite, universal axiomatization of a theory
of triangular numbers with open induction. This finite axiomatization of
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the theory of triangular numbers will be used in Section 4, to show that
there exists a clause set that is refutable by a clause set cycle but that is
not refutable by open induction. The result presented in this section is a
generalization of the finite axiomatization for multiplication-free arithmetic
with open induction provided by Shoenfield in [9].
Let n ∈ N, then by △n we denote the n-th triangular number
∑n
i=0 i =
n(n + 1)/2. By L⊲ we denote the one-sorted first-order language consisting
of the function symbols 0/0, s/1, p/1, +/2, and the binary predicate symbol
⊲. The predicate symbol ⊲ will be written in infix notation.
Definition 10. By T⊲ we denote the theory axiomatized by
∀x sx 6= 0. (A1)
p0 = 0. (A2)
∀x psx = x. (A3)
∀xx+ 0 = x. (A4)
∀x∀y x+ sy = s(x+ y). (A5)
0 ⊲ 0. (A6)
∀x∀y (x ⊲ y → sx ⊲ sx+ y). (A7)
∀x∀y (sx ⊲ sx+ y → x ⊲ y). (A8)
∀x∀y ∀z (x ⊲ y ∧ x ⊲ z → y = z). (A9)
The standard model for this theory is denoted by N⊲. The model N⊲
interprets the symbols 0, s, p,+ in the natural way. The predicate symbol ⊲
is interpreted as the graph of the triangle function i.e. the function associating
with each natural number n the triangular number △n.
Lemma 11. The theory T⊲ + IOpen(L⊲) proves the following formulas
∀x (x 6= 0→ x = spx). (B1)
∀xx+ y = y + x. (B2)
∀x∀y ∀z (x+ y) + z = x+ (y + z). (B3)
∀x∀y ∀z (x+ y = x+ z → y = z). (B4)
The axiom (A9) is not redundant for the axiomatization of the theory
T⊲ + IOpen(L⊲). This can be seen by taking the standard interpretation
of the symbols 0, s, p, + and by interpreting ⊲ as the set {(n,△n) | n ∈
N} ∪ {(n,△n + 1) | n ∈ N}.
Definition 12. By T I⊲ we denote the theory T⊲ + B1 + B2 + B3 + B4.
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Our axiomatization of the theory T I⊲ is not minimal, because (A3) can be
derived from the other axioms. Another simple but important observation
is that for every formula ϕ(y) of the language L⊲ we have
T I⊲ ⊢ ϕ(spx)↔ (x = 0 ∧ ϕ(s0)) ∨ (x 6= 0 ∧ ϕ(x)). (7)
We will now show that every formula in T I⊲ is equivalent to some formula
that is “simple” in the following sense.
Definition 13. A term t is simple if it is of the form n1x1+ · · ·+nkxk+m,
where m ∈ N. An atom t1 = t2 (or t1 ⊲ t2) is simple if both t1 and t2 are
simple. A formula is simple if all of its atoms are simple.
After showing the following proposition we will mainly work with simple
formulas thus relieving the arguments of tedious details such as dealing with
the symbol p and term rewriting steps.
Proposition 14. Let ϕ be a formula, then there exists a simple formula ψ
such that T I⊲ ⊢ ϕ↔ ψ.
Proof. Simple formulas do not contain the symbol p and on the other hand,
obtaining a simple formula from a formula not containing the symbol p is
just a matter of rewriting the formula with associativity, commutativity, and
the definition of +. Thus it only remains to show that every formula in T I⊲
is equivalent to a formula that does not contain the symbol p.
We are now working in the theory T I⊲ . Let us start with an important
observation. Let t be a term containing the symbol p. Then by using as-
sociativity, commutativity and the definition of +, it is possible to permute
the symbol s in the term s(t) inwards until it is directly above an occurrence
of the symbol p.
Let ψ be a formula containing an occurrence of p. We start by eliminating
the symbol p from the right hand argument of triangle atoms. After that we
eliminate the symbol p from the left hand argument of triangle atoms. In
the final step we eliminate the symbol p from the equational atoms. During
the first step we may introduce finitely many new occurrences of p in the
right argument of triangle atoms and in equational atoms. Similarly, new
occurrences of p may be introduced in equational atoms during the second
step. These new occurrences are not problematic since they are eliminated
by the following steps.
Assume that ψ contains an occurrence of p in the left argument of a
triangle atom. Consider the triangle atoms of ψ and let ϕ := t1 ⊲ t2 be
a triangle atom of ψ having the largest number of occurrences of p in the
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left hand argument. By (A7) and (A8) the atom ϕ is equivalent to ϕ′ :=
s(t1) ⊲ s(t1) + t2. Obtain an equivalent atom ϕ
′′ from ϕ′ by permuting
in the left hand argument term s(t1) the symbol s inwards, as described
above, until it is directly above an occurrence of p. Now apply (7) to ϕ′′
in order to obtain an equivalent formula ϕ′′′. Let ψ′ be obtained from ψ by
replacing ϕ by ϕ′′′. Observe that the triangle atoms of ψ′ do not contain more
occurrences of p in the left argument, than the triangle atoms of ψ. Moreover,
ψ′ contains strictly fewer triangle atoms having as many occurrences of p in
the left argument as ϕ. We can thus iterate this argument until the resulting
formula does not contain a triangle atom having an occurrence of p in its
left argument.
In the next step we will eliminate the occurrences of p in the right ar-
guments of triangle atoms. By the previous step we can now assume that
ψ does not contain p in the left argument of triangle atoms. Moreover, we
assume that ψ contains an occurrence of p in the right argument of a triangle
atom. We proceed analogously to the first step and successively decrease the
number of triangle atoms having the largest number of occurrences of p in
the right argument. The crucial observation is that by doing so we do not
introduce any occurrence of p on the left side of a triangle atom. By iterating
this argument we eventually obtain a formula whose triangle atoms are free
of the symbol p.
It remains to show that we can eliminate the occurrences of p from equa-
tional atoms without introducing triangle atoms containing p. We assume
that ψ contains p and that its triangle atoms are free of p. We proceed
similarly to the two steps above, first replacing an atom t1 = t2 containing
p by the equivalent atom s(t1) = s(t2), then moving s inwards and finally
applying the equivalence (7). It is easy to see that this does not introduce
new occurrences of p.
At this point the reader might wonder why the authors chose to include a
function symbol for the predecessor function and go through the technicali-
ties of eliminating the symbol p from formulas instead of providing additional
axioms. The idea is to work with purely universal axiomatizations so that
one can in particular apply Herbrand’s theorem. In order to avoid the sym-
bol p we would have to include an axiom containing an existential quantifier
such as ∀x∃y ((x = 0 ∧ y = 0) ∨ (x 6= 0 ∧ x = s(y))). As a consequence,
we would later run into similar technicalities when dealing with the this ex-
istential quantifier. In fact, the function symbol p is just a Skolem function
introduced for the axiom given above.
We have now everything at hand to start with the model theoretic con-
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siderations of the theory T I⊲ . In the following we fix an arbitrary model M
of the theory T I⊲ . Our aim is to show that M is also a model of open induc-
tion over the language L⊲. By 0, S, P, +, and ◮ we denote the respective
interpretations of the symbols 0, s, p, +, and ⊲ in the model M. We start
with a few simple observations about the structure of the model M.
Definition 15. Let a, b ∈ M, then we define a ≺ b if there exists n ≥ 1
such that Sna = b. Accordingly we define a  b if a ≺ b or a = b. We say
that a and b are comparable (in symbols a ∼ b), if a  b or b  a.
It is not hard to see that the relation  is a partial order and that ∼ is
an equivalence relation. Let a be an element of M, then by [a] we denote
the equivalence class of a under ∼. It is easy to see that  is total on [a].
Hence classes of comparable elements together with  form chains. Let us
now look a bit more closely at these chains. As a simple consequence of
(B4) we have ∀xx+ k 6= x for all k ≥ 1. Therefore the chains of comparable
elements are infinite. Consider now the class of elements comparable with 0
and let a be an element comparable with 0. Then by (A1) we have a = Sm0
for some natural number m, that is, 0 is the least element of this chain. The
chain of elements comparable with 0 thus looks as follows:
0 ≺ S10 ≺ S20 ≺ S30 ≺ . . . .
This chain is isomorphic to the chain of natural numbers with ≤ and the
addition. This is why we will call the elements comparable with 0, the
standard elements (of M). Elements that do not belong to this chain are
called non-standard elements (of M).
Before we have a look at the structure of a chains of non-standard ele-
ments let us summarize some basic properties of M.
Lemma 16. Let a, b be elements of M
1. If a is a non-standard element, then Pa is a non-standard element.
2. If a is a non-standard element and m ∈ N, then a = SmPma.
3. The element a + b is a standard element if and only if a and b are
standard elements.
Proof. For (1.) let a be a non-standard element of M, then a 6= 0. Thus by
(B1) the element Pa is also a non-standard element.
For (2.) if a is non-standard, then a 6= 0 and by (B1) we have a = SPa.
By the (1.) the element Pa is non-standard, so we have P = SP(Pa) thus
a = S2P2a and so on.
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For (3.) consider now an element of the form a + b. If a and b are
both standard elements, then it is clear that a + b is a standard element.
Now suppose that a + b is a standard element and suppose without loss
of generality that a is not a standard element. Then there exists m ∈ N
such that Sm0 = a + b = b + a = b + Sm+1Pm+1a. By (A3) we obtain
0 = SPm+1a which contradicts (A1). Hence a must also be a standard
element.
Let us now consider the chain of elements comparable with a non-standard
element a of M. Let n,m be natural numbers with n < k, then by Lemma
16 we have SnPka = Pk−na. Hence we have Pka ≺ Pk−na. Let b be com-
parable with a, then either a = Smb or b = Sma i.e. b = Pma or b = Sma
for some natural number m. The chain thus has the following structure:
· · · ≺ P3a ≺ P2a ≺ P1a ≺ a ≺ S1a ≺ S2a ≺ S3a ≺ . . . .
The chain of elements comparable with a is isomorphic to the integers with
the order <.
We define the language L⊲(M) to be the extension of the language L⊲
by a constant symbol a for every element a of M. We let the L⊲ structure
M interpret L⊲(M) formulas by interpreting for every element a of M the
constant a as itself. The language L⊲(M) will be especially convenient when
we need to insert elements ofM into L⊲ terms and L⊲ formulas. Let ϕ(x) be
an L⊲(M) formula. We call an element a ofM a solution of ϕ if ϕ(a) is true
in M. Similarly we call ϕ valid in M if ϕ(a) is true in M for all elements
a of M. In the following we will show the crucial observation that simple
atomic formulas are either valid in M or have only finitely many pairwise
comparable solutions.
Proposition 17. Let ϕ(x, ~y) be a simple atomic formula, ~b a vector of el-
ements of M, then either ϕ(x,~b) is valid in M or ϕ(x,~b) has only finitely
many pairwise comparable solutions.
Proof. Depending on the form of ϕ we need to distinguish between two
cases. If ϕ is of the form s = t, then clearly ϕ(x,~b) is equivalent in M
to mx + c = nx + d for some c, d ∈ M. The claim then follows from
Lemma 1 in [9]. If ϕ is of the form s ⊲ t, then ϕ(x,~b) is equivalent in M
to mx+ c ◮ nx+ d for some n,m ∈ N and c, d ∈ M. We need to consider
two cases:
• For m = 0, we assume that there are at least two comparable solutions
e and Spe of ϕ(x,~b) with p > 0. We have c ◮ ne+ d and c ◮ nSpe+ d.
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Therefore by (A9) we have ne+ d = nSpe+ d. By (B2) and (A5) we
obtain ne+d = Snp0+ne+d. By (B4) we then have 0 = Snp0. Hence
we clearly have n = 0. Thus ne + d = d, and therefore c ◮ d is true
in M. Because of that c ◮ nx+ d is valid in M.
• For m > 0, we will show that there are at most two comparable solu-
tions of ϕ(x,~b). We proceed indirectly and assume that there are at
least three pairwise comparable solutions e, Sp1e, and Sp2e of ϕ(x,~b)
with 0 < p1 < p2. Since e is a solution we have me+ c ◮ ne+ d. Let
i ∈ {1, 2}, then iterating (A7) and straightforward rewriting we have
S
pim(me+ c) ◮ S△pim0+ pim(me+ c) + ne+ d.
Since Spie is a solution of ϕ(x,~b) we have m(Spie) + c ◮ n(Spie) + d.
Therefore by (A5), (A9), (B2) and (B4) we obtain
S△pim0+ pim(me+ c) = S
npi0.
Thus the element me+ c is a standard element of M. Therefore there
exists k ∈ N such thatme+c = Sk0. We thus have S△pim0+pimS
k0 =
Snpi0. Hence by (A1) and because S is injective we obtain
△pim + pimk = npi.
Hence m2p1 +m + 2mk = 2n = m
2p2 +m+ 2mk. But since m 6= 0,
this contradicts the assumption that p1 < p2.
We are now ready to show thatM is a model of open induction over the
language L⊲. The proof is analogous to the proof given in [9]. For the sake
of completeness we outline the main steps of the proof.
Theorem 18. Let M be a model of T I⊲ , then M is a model of IOpen(L⊲).
Proof. Let θ(x, ~z) be a quantifier-free L⊲ formula. We have to show that
M |= Ixθ(x, ~z). By Proposition 14 we can assume without loss of generality
that θ is a simple formula. Let ~b be a vector of elements of M and let
θ′(x) := θ(x,~b). Assume that θ′(0) is true in M and θ′(x) → θ′(S(x)) is
valid in M. Let a be an arbitrary element ofM. If a is a standard element,
then a = Sm0 for some natural number m. So by applying the induction
step repeatedly, starting with θ′(0), we obtain θ′(a).
Now let us consider the case when a is non-standard. Consider the atoms
from which θ′(x) is built. By Proposition 17 there are two types of atoms:
those that are valid in M, and those that have at most finitely many (two)
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pairwise comparable solutions. Valid atoms are true in M regardless of the
choice of x, so we need to consider only the remaining atoms. By successively
letting x 7→ a, x 7→ P1a, x 7→ P2a, and so on, we will eventually exhaust
all the solutions ( a) of any invalid atom of θ′(x). In other words, by
choosing N ∈ N large enough, the element Pna, with N ≤ n, falsifies all the
invalid atoms. The same trick works for standard elements, starting at 0 and
successively considering S10, S20, and so forth. Now by taking m ∈ N large
enough so that both Pma and Sm0 falsify all the invalid atoms, we observe
that θ′(Sm0) and θ′(Pma) have the same truth value inM. Therefore, since
θ′(Sm0) is true in M, also θ′(Pma) is true. Since SmPma = a, we can
simply apply the induction step m times to find that θ′(a) is true inM.
The finite, universal axiomatizability of T⊲ + IOpen(L⊲) now follows
immediately from Theorem 18, completeness of first-order logic, and from
Lemma 11.
Theorem 19. Let ϕ be a formula, then T⊲ + IOpen(L⊲) ⊢ ϕ if and only if
T I⊲ ⊢ ϕ.
4 Clause Set Cycles and Open Induction
In Section 2 we have shown that refutability by a clause set cycle is contained
in the theory of ∃1 induction. The next obvious question to ask is whether
refutability by a clause set cycle is also contained in the theory of open in-
duction. In this section we will provide a negative answer to that question by
making use of the finite axiomatizability of the theory of triangular numbers
with open induction shown in Section 3. In order to provide such a negative
answer it suffices to provide a clause set which is refutable by a clause set
cycle, but that is not refutable by open induction. A candidate clause set is
readily found.
Definition 20. We denote by S⊲(η) the clause set consisting of the clauses
(A4) – (A7) and the clause ∀y¬η ⊲ y.
Let us denote by L′⊲ the language of the clause set S⊲. The clause set S⊲
expresses that the triangle function is not total.
Lemma 21. The clause set S⊲(η) is refutable by a clause set cycle.
Proof. By the soundness of first-order logic it suffices to show that
S⊲(0) ⊢ ⊥, (8)
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and
S⊲(s(η)) ⊢ S⊲(η). (9)
For (8) we have S⊲(0) ⊢ 0 ⊲ 0 and S⊲(0) ⊢ ∀y ¬0 ⊲ y. Hence S⊲(0) ⊢ ⊥. For
(9) we assume S⊲(s(η)). The clauses of S⊲ not having free variables occur in
S⊲(s(η)), hence we only need to show that S⊲(s(η)) ⊢ ∀y ¬η ⊲ y. Let y be
arbitrary, then obtain S⊲(s(η)) ⊢ ¬s(η) ⊲ s(η) + y. By the contrapositive of
(A7) we have ¬η ⊲ y. Therefore the clause set S⊲ is a clause set cycle. Since
a clause set cycle is trivially refuted by itself, we are done.
It now remains to show that S⊲ cannot be refuted by open induction. In
order to be able to make use of Theorem 19, we will now reformulate the
clause set S⊲ in terms of a theory of triangular numbers. In the following we
denote by T ′⊲ the theory axiomatized by the formulas (A4) – (A7).
Lemma 22. IOpen(L′⊲) 6⊢ ¬S⊲(η) if and only if T
′
⊲+ IOpen(L
′
⊲) 6⊢ ∀x∃y x ⊲
y.
Proof. We have the following chain of equivalences.
IOpen(L′⊲) ⊢ ¬S⊲(η)
⇔ IOpen(L′⊲) ⊢ ¬((A4) ∧ · · · ∧ (A7) ∧ ∀y¬η ⊲ y)
⇔ IOpen(L′⊲) ⊢ ¬((A4) ∧ · · · ∧ (A7) ∧ ¬∃y η ⊲ y)
⇔ IOpen(L′⊲) ⊢ (A4) ∧ · · · ∧ (A7)→ ∃y η ⊲ y
⇔ IOpen(L′⊲) ⊢ (A4) ∧ · · · ∧ (A7)→ ∀x∃y x ⊲ y
By the deduction theorem we thus have IOpen(L′⊲) ⊢ ¬S⊲(η) if and only if
T ′⊲ + IOpen(L
′
⊲) ⊢ ∀x∃y x ⊲ y.
In order to complete the negative answer it clearly suffices to show that
T⊲ + IOpen(L⊲) 6⊢ ∀x∃y x ⊲ y.
Proposition 23. T⊲ + IOpen(L⊲) 6⊢ ∀x∃y x ⊲ y.
Proof. We proceed indirectly and assume that T⊲+IOpen(L⊲) ⊢ ∀x∃y x ⊲ y.
By Theorem 19 we then also have T I⊲ ⊢ ∀x∃y x ⊲ y. Since T
I
⊲ is a universal
theory we can apply Herbrand’s theorem to obtain terms t1(x), . . . , tk(x)
such that
T I⊲ ⊢
k∨
i=1
x ⊲ ti(x).
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Clearly N⊲ is a model of T I⊲ and the triangle function ⊲
N
⊲
is quadratic. Since
the terms ti(x), with i = 1, . . . , k describe linear functions in N
⊲, there exists
m ∈ N such that
N
⊲ 6|=
k∨
i=1
m ⊲ ti(m).
Contradiction!
Corollary 24. The clause set S⊲(η) is refutable by a clause set cycle and
IOpen(L′⊲) 6⊢ ¬S⊲(η).
To summarize we thus have shown the following theorem.
Theorem 25. There exists a language L, and an L clause set S(x) refutable
by clause set cycles such that IOpen(L) 6⊢ ¬S(x).
Since refutability by a clause set cycle is not contained in open induction,
the next obvious question to ask is whether every clause set that is refutable
with open induction is also refutable by a clause set cycle. We believe that
this is not the case. Intuitively, this can be explained by the following two
points: first clause set cycles do not allow for any free variables and secondly
clause set cycles only allow for existential quantification. These two short-
comings of clause set cycles can be demonstrated by the following example.
We assume the usual right recursive definition of the addition from which
we want to prove the sentence ϕ ≡ ∀xx+(x+ x) = (x+x)+ x. To prove ϕ
with open induction, we first prove by open induction on the variable y the
inductive formula ψ(x) ≡ ∀y x+ (x+ y) = (x+ x) + y. The “lemma” ψ can
now be used to prove ϕ by instantiating the universally quantified variable
y by x. In this example both ideas mentioned above came into play, that is,
the “lemma” ψ contains a free variable and it contains a universal quantifier
that is actually used to prove ϕ.
Conjecture 26. There exists a language L, and an L clause set S(x) such
that IOpen(L) ⊢ ¬S(x) but S(x) is not refutable by a clause set cycle.
5 The n-Clause Calculus: A Case Study
In this section we will use the notion of clause set cycle in order to derive
results about a concrete approach for AITP – the n-clause calculus. The
n-clause calculus is a formalism for AITP that was introduced by Kersani
and Peltier in [8]. This calculus enhances a superposition calculus by a cycle
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detection mechanism. This mechanism detects a certain type of cyclic depen-
dencies between the clauses that are derived during the saturation process.
Such a cyclic dependency represents an argument by infinite descent and,
therefore, represents an unsatisfiable subset of the derived clauses. Once
such a cycle is detected the refutation is terminated. The n-clause calcu-
lus operates on a syntactically restricted fragment of the logical formalism
presented in Section 2. The languages in this section are assumed to con-
tain at least one other sort, say ι, besides the sort nat of natural numbers.
Furthermore, the languages should not contain any other function symbols
of range nat besides 0 and s. By an n-clause we understand a clause of the
form ∀~x (N(η, ~x)∨C(~x)), where N(η, ~x) is a disjunction of atoms of the form
η 6= t(~x) and C is a disjunction of literals of the form t = s with t and s
being terms of sort other than nat. The formula N is called the constraint
part of the n-clause. An n-clause set is a conjunction of n-clauses. For the
sake of readability we will sometimes identify an n-clause set with the set of
its conjuncts. The notion of “cycles” of the n-clause calculus is based on the
descent operator ↓j with j ∈ N.
Definition 27. Let i ∈ N, and C = ∀~x (N(η, ~x) ∨ C(~x)) an n-clause with
N =
∨k
j=1 η 6= tj. Then we define C↓i := ∀~x (N(η, ~x)↓i∨C(~x)) where N↓i :=∨k
j=1 η 6= s
i(tj). For an n-clause set S =
∧m
j=1 Cj we define S↓i :=
∧m
j=1 Cj↓i.
Intuitively, the ↓j operation allows us to express that η is replaced by its
j-th predecessor. The following lemma states a crucial property of the ↓j
operator.
Lemma 28. Let S(η) be clause set and j ≥ 0, then we have S↓j(s
jη) ⊢ S(η).
The converse of the above entailment does not hold. However it holds in
a theory that provides at least the injectivity of the successor function.
Lemma 29. Let S(η) be a clause set and j ≥ 0, then
∀x∀y (sx = sy → x = y), S(η) ⊢ S↓j(s
jη).
We can now introduce the notions of cycle and of refutability by a cycle.
For the sake of brevity we consider a simplified variant of the n-clause cal-
culus defined in [8]. Only one of the simplifications imposed by us restricts
the power of the formalism. The cycles presented in [8] rely on a decidable
entailment relation ⊒ between clauses such that C ⊒ D implies C |=KP D,
where |=KP is the entailment for the “Kersani-Peltier” standard semantics as
presented in [8]. Whenever the original formalism requires C ⊒ D, we require
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that C |= D. On the one hand the relation |= is not decidable, but on the
other hand the relation |= allows us to use the completeness of first-order
logic. The latter would not be possible with ⊒ because this relation relies
on standard semantics for which the completeness theorem does not hold.
According to [8] the relation ⊒ is intended to abstract decidable relations
such as syntactic equality or subsumption that also satisfy our stronger re-
quirement. Hence our restriction does not rule out any practically relevant
instance of the n-clause calculus. Finally, our restriction does not limit the
generality of Corollary 34 below, since a similar argument could be used,
assuming a suitable choice of ⊒.
Definition 30. Let R(η) be an n-clause set. A triple (i, j, S(η)) with i, j ∈ N,
j > 0 and S ⊆ R is a cycle for R if S ⊢ η 6= k for k = i, . . . , i + j − 1 and
S ⊢ S↓j . We say that R is refuted by a cycle if there exists a cycle (i, j, S)
for R and R ⊢ η 6= k, for k = 0, . . . , i− 1.
A cycle (i, j, S(η)) for a clause set R(η) is similar to an argument by
induction with an offset i and a step with j. Accordingly, the conditions
S ⊢ n 6= k for k = i, . . . , i + j − 1 correspond to the j base cases, whereas
the condition S ⊢ S↓j corresponds to the step case.
Cycles of the n-clause calculus are thus structurally similar to clause set
cycles. As announced in Section 1 we will show that clause set cycles are
an abstraction of the cycles of the n-clause calculus. In order to show that
every n-clause set refutable by a cycle is also refuted by a clause set cycle
it essentially remains to show that the argument by induction with offset i
and step j can be turned into an argument by structural induction.
Proposition 31. Let R be an n-clause set refuted by a cycle, then R is
refuted by a clause set cycle.
Proof. Let (i, j, S(η)) be a cycle refuting R. Consider the formula
T (η) :=
j−1∨
k=0
S(sk+iη).
It is not difficult to see that T (η) is logically equivalent to a clause. Since
S is a cycle, we have S(η) ⊢ η 6= i+ k for k = 0, . . . , j − 1. Therefore by
instantiating η by i+ k we obtain S(i+ k) ⊢ ⊥ for k = 0, . . . , j − 1. Hence
we have T (0) ⊢ ⊥.
Let k ∈ {0, . . . , j − 2}, then we clearly have S(sk+i+1η) ⊢ T (η). Now let
k = j − 1. Since S is a cycle, we have S ⊢ S↓j . Thus by Lemma 28 we
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obtain S(si+jη) ⊢ S(siη). Therefore T (sη) ⊢ T (η). Thus, by the soundness
of first-order logic T (η) is a clause set cycle. Since S ⊆ R we have R ⊢ S and
therefore R(siη) ⊢ T (η). Now let k = 0, . . . , i − 1, then since R ⊢ n 6= k we
have R(k) ⊢ ⊥. Therefore, by the soundness of first-order logic R is refuted
by the clause set cycle T .
By the above proposition the notion of refutation of an n-clause set by
a cycle is also not stronger than ∃1 induction. In the following we will show
that an analogue of Theorem 25 also holds for the n-clause calculus. Let
L be the language consisting of the two sorts nat, ι, the function symbols
0 : nat, s : nat → nat, + : nat × ι → ι, c : ι, and the predicate symbol
⊲ : nat× ι. We will again use the predicate symbol ⊲ as an infix symbol. Let
S(η) be the L n-clause set consisting of the following n-clauses.
0 ⊲ c, (C1)
∀x∀y (x ⊲ y → s(x) ⊲ s(x) + y), (C2)
∀x∀y (η = x→ ¬x ⊲ y). (C3)
Lemma 32. The n-clause set S(η) is refuted by a cycle.
Proof. By resolving the clauses (C1) and (C3), we obtain S ⊢ η 6= 0. Re-
solving the clauses (C2) and (C3) yields η = s(x)→ ¬x ⊲ y. Hence we have
S ⊢ S↓1. Thus the triple (0, 1, S(η)) is a cycle for S(η). Therefore S(η) is
refuted by a cycle.
Let us now investigate whether S(η) can be refuted by open induction.
Proposition 33. IOpen(L) 6⊢ ¬S(η).
Proof. Assume that IOpen(L) ⊢ ¬S(η). Let L′ be the one-sorted language
obtained from L by replacing the sort ι by the sort nat. We then have
IOpen(L′) ⊢ ¬S(η). By replacing the constant c by 0, we obtain
IOpen(L′⊲) ⊢ ¬S[c/0](η).
This implies IOpen(L′⊲) ⊢ ¬S⊲(η), thus, contradicting Corollary 24.
By Lemma 32 and Proposition 33 we thus have:
Corollary 34. There exists a language L and an L n-clause set S(η) refuted
by a cycle such that IOpen 6⊢ ¬S(η).
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6 Conclusion
We have introduced the concept of clause set cycles and the notion of refutabil-
ity by a clause set cycle. Clause set cycles abstract the analogous concepts of
cycle and refutability by a cycle of the n-clause calculus. The main advantage
of clause set cycles is their semantic nature, which makes them independent
of any inference system. This independence of an inference system allows for
a more general analysis of the properties of this type of cycle.
We have explained clause set cycles in terms of theories of induction. We
first have shown that refutability by a clause set cycle is contained in the
theory of ∃1 induction. On the other hand refutation by a clause set cycle
is not contained in the theory of open induction and we even conjecture
that open induction is incomparable with the refutability by a clause set
cycle. Finally, we have transferred these results to the n-clause calculus.
The results allow us to formally situate the strength of the n-clause calculus
with respect to induction, where we formerly only had empirical evidence.
The formal results described in this article improve our understanding of the
strength of the approaches for AITP based on clause set cycles and help to
direct further research.
As mentioned in the introduction, the analysis of clause set cycles is
part of a research program which aims at studying methods for automated
inductive theorem proving in order to improve the theoretical foundations of
this subject. One of the next questions to consider is how clause set cycles
can be extended to handle multiple parameters, how this extension would
impact the power of the formalism, and how the addition of parameters can
be explained from the perspective of induction. Another question to consider
is how the enhancement of superposition by structural induction presented
by Cruanes in [5] is related to clause set cycles. We are also interested
in fragments of the cyclic sequent calculi introduced by Brotherston and
Simpson in [2]. The inductive theorem prover “Cyclist” [1] is based on the
cut-free cyclic sequent calculus, but it is yet unclear how the restriction to
the cut-free fragment affects the power of the system.
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